Performance comparison of the AODV, SAODV and FLSL routing protocols in mobile ad hoc networks by Jin, Lu et al.
Performance Comparison of the AODV, SAODV and FLSL Routing Protocols
in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Lu Jin Zhongwei Zhang
Department of Mathematics and Computing
University of Southern Queensland
{jin,zhongwei}@usq.edu.au
Hong Zhou
Faculty of Engineering and Surveying
University of Southern Queensland
hzhou@usq.edu.au
Abstract
Mobile ad-hoc networks operate in the absence of
any supporting infrastructure. The absence of any fixed
infrastructure in mobile ad-hoc networks makes it dif-
ficult to utilize the existing techniques for network ser-
vices, and poses number of various challenges in the
area. The discovery and maintenance of secure route is
the most flinty challenge.
In this paper, we first deliberate and implement one
secure routing protocol FLSL (Adaptive Fuzzy Logic
Based Security Level Routing Protocol) and study its
performance under different scenarios. Then we carry
out a number of experiments using NS-2 to compare the
performance of AODV, SAODV and FLSL in terms of
security level and routing discovery time under different
setups. From these experiments, we can see that FLSL
outperforms than AODV and SAODV.
1. Introduction
An ad hoc network is a group of wireless mobile
computers (or nodes), in which nodes cooperate by for-
warding packets for each other to allow them to commu-
nicate beyond direct wireless transmission range. Ad
hoc networks require no centralized administration or
fixed network infrastructure, and can be quickly and in-
expensively set up as needed, such as military exercises
and disaster relief. However, secure and reliable com-
munication is a necessary prerequisite for such applica-
tions.
In early time, researchers in ad hoc networking
have generally studied the routing problems in a non-
adversarial network setting, assuming a trusted environ-
ment, relatively little research has been done in a more
realistic setting in which an adversary may attempt to
disrupt the communication. Consequently, current mo-
bile ad hoc networks have no security mechanism, this
could possibly lead active attackers to easily exploit or
possibly disable the mobile ad hoc network. So far,
secure routing protocols emerged but largely relied on
the key management, authentication and encryption al-
gorithm. These traditional routing protocols such as
SAODV [2], SRP [3] and SAR [4] don’t adapt to a
higher security level route even if there are a few routing
paths, since the security level and selection of route are
not part of their normal operations. Therefore, special
secure routing protocols, which is security conscious,
are needed for mobile ad hoc networks.
In this paper, the implementation of a new secu-
rity conscious routing protocol, FSLS, is described. The
rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we provides an overview of AODV, SAODV and FLSL
routing protocols. In Section 3, we describe the settings
for the simulations and experiments. Results and dis-
cussions are presented in Section 4. Conclusions are
given in Section 5.
2. Protocol Description
In this section, we briefly describe the AODV,
SAODV and FLSL routing protocols.
2.1. AODV Protocol
The Ad Hoc on Demand Distance Vector Rout-
ing Protocol (AODV) is a source initiated, on demand
driven, routing protocol [6]. Since the routing is on de-
mand, a route is only traced when a source node wants
to establish communication with a specific destination.
The route remains established as long as it is needed for
further communication. Furthermore, another feature of
AODV is its use of a destination sequence number for
every route entry. This number is included in the RREQ
(Route Request) of any node that desires to send data.
These numbers are used to ensure the freshness of rout-
ing information. For instance, a requesting node always
chooses the route with the greatest sequence number to
communicate with its destination node. Once a fresh
path is found, a RREP (Route Reply) is sent back to the
requesting node. AODV also has the necessary mecha-
nism to inform network nodes of any possible link break
that might have occurred in the network [7].
2.2. SAODV Protocol
The Secure Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector
Routing Protocol (SAODV) [8] is an extension of the
AODV [9] routing protocol that can be used to protect
the route discovery mechanism providing security fea-
tures like integrity, authentication and non-repudiation.
SAODV assumes that each ad hoc node has a signa-
ture key pair from a suitable asymmetric cryptosystem.
Further, each ad hoc node is capable of securely veri-
fying the association between the address of a given ad
hoc node and the public key of that node. Achieving
this is the job of the key management scheme.
Two mechanisms are used to secure the AODV
messages: digital signatures to authenticate the non-
mutable fields of the messages, and hash chains to se-
cure the hop count information (the only mutable infor-
mation in the messages). This is because for the non-
mutable information, authentication can be performed
in a point-to-point manner, but the same kind of tech-
niques cannot be applied to the mutable information.
Route error messages are protected in a different
manner because they have a big amount of mutable in-
formation. In addition, it is not relevant which node
started the route error and which nodes are just forward-
ing it. The only relevant information is that a neighbor
node is informing to another node that it is not going
to be able to route messages to certain destinations any-
more.
Therefore, every node (generating or forwarding a
route error message) uses digital signatures to sign the
whole message and that any neighbor that receives ver-
ifies the signature.
2.3. FLSL Protocol
The Adaptive Fuzzy Logic Based Security Level
Routing Protocol (FLSL) [5] is developed basing on
SAODV protocol, and security level algorithm has
been used to assess the reliability (so-called Security-
Level)of mobile hosts and determine the most secure
route among a few possible routes.
In FLSL, An new attribute, Security Level, is intro-
duced in the format of protocol control messages and
routing table to denote the reliability and dependabil-
ity of certain mobile host or route. Meantime, because
FLSL protocol enable the destination node to accept
multi-Route Request message, the security level is also
used by source node and destination node to determine
the most secure route.
In MANET environment, the security-level of a
mobile host is affected by many conditions. We have
investigated three factors which are irrespective and in-
dependent with each other though [10], as follows:
1. Secret key length (l). Longer the secret key is,
stronger to defend serious brute force attack.
2. Changing frequency of secret key (f ). If mobile
host’s secret key is changeable, the difficulty of
decryption must be increased and security level of
mobile hosts also get enhanced.
3. Amount of active neighbor hosts (n). More active
neighbor hosts existing will increase the percent-
age of potential attackers existing.
Apparently, the security level of a single mobile
host has a relation with these three factors as follows:
S ∝ l× f × 1
n
(1)
The Security-Level of a route is decided by the
node which has the lowest Security-Level in that route.
In another word, the route with the highest Security-
Level is comparably most secure. More precisely, if we
define the source node as S and the destination node as
D and assume that there are totally n possible routes,
i.e. R1,R2, . . . ,Rn, from the source S to the destina-
tion D . In the route Ri, there are intermediate nodes
ni1,n
i
2, . . . ,n
i
j, . . . ,n
i
m, totally m possible relay nodes to
forward the packets from the source to the destination.
If the current Security-Level of the jth node in the
ith route is Si j, the Security Level of the ith route is de-
fined as:
SLi = min(Si j), j ∈ (1, . . . ,m) (2)
The most desired route Rk is the maximum value of
all those route [10], i.e.:
SLk = max
i∈{1,2,...,n}
(SLi) = max
i∈{1,2,...,n}
( min
j∈{1,2,...,n}
(Si j)) (3)
Therefore,the FLSL protocol is capable of deter-
mining a more secure route among possible routes by
comparing the security level while the security level of
each individual node is evaluated. The procedures of
route discovery is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 FLSL Route Discovery
Source node S calculates SLS and generates RREQ
Source node S broadcasts RREQ to all of its neighbors
while Neighbor node i is not destination node D do
Authenticate and verify the RREQ
Calculate node i’s security level SLi
if SLi < SLq then
Update the security level in the RREQ packet by overwriting
the SLq in RREQ with SLi
end if
Broadcast the RREQ to node i’s neighbour nodes
end while
for all RREQ messages received by destination node D do
if There is available route to source node S then
if SLq > SLRT then
Update routing table using the latest data in RREQ
else
Drop the RREQ
end if
else
Create entry in routing table using the latest data in RREQ
end if
Increase sequence number by 1
Create a RREP
Unicast RREP back to source node S
end for
for all RREP messages received by source node S do
Update routing table using the latest data in RREP
end for
3. Simulation and Experiment
In this section, we carry out some experiments us-
ing network simulation technology. Our objective is to
firstly demonstrate the feasibility of FLSL which can
effectively discover a routing and then update the corre-
sponding routing tables on the nodes on route. Another
objective is to evaluate performance in the security-
level and timing of route discovery.
Up to date, we are not aware of any implementation
of SAODV. To this end, we modified some modules in
AODV-UU for SAODV by utilizing Libgcrypt library
[11].
3.1. Experiment Platform Setup
The experiments and simulations are conducted in
NS-2 platform[9]. The network topology consists of
(N2+2) nodes, where N = {4,5,6,7,8,9}. For all ses-
sions, one Constant Bits Rate (CBR) sessions generate
UPD packets from node 0 to node (N2 + 1). The de-
tailed parameters are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Parameters used in experiment sce-
nario
Parameter Value
Application traffic CBR
Radio Range 100 m
Packet Size 512 bytes
Maximum speed 1 m/s
Simulation time 5 minutes
Number of nodes N2 + 2,N ∈ (4,5,6,7,8)
(Random initial topology)
Area 1000 m 1000 m
4. Results and Discussions
In this section, we test the feasibility of FLSL on
NS-2 under different scenarios.
4.1. Feasibility of FLSL
Nodes located in random initial topologies.
Figure 1 and 2 show the RREQ and RREP pack-
ets transmission route of FLSL protocol in 27 nodes
MANET network. The numbered lines indicate the de-
tailed procedures of route discovery. From the simula-
tion, we may observe that the discovered route in FLSL
(N0 → N2 → N8 → N25 → N3 → N13 → N20 → N26) is
different with the route in AODV (N0 → N5 → N23 →
N25 →N22 →N13 →N20 →N26) and in SAODV (N0 →
N5 →N23 →N25 →N22 →N13 →N20 →N26). Figure 3
shows the security level comparison of discovered route
between FLSL protocol AODV protocol and SAODV
protocol in same topology of 27 random nodes. We may
observe that the security level value of final route is 49
in FLSL protocol which is 104.17% higher than 24 in
AODV and SAODV protocol.
Figure 4 and 5 show the RREQ and RREP pack-
ets transmission route of FLSL protocol in 38 nodes
MANET network. The numbered lines indicate the de-
tailed procedures of route discovery. From the simula-
tion, we may observe that the discovered route in FLSL
(N0 → N23 → N25 → N22 → N18 → N20 → N37) is dif-
ferent with the route in AODV (N0 → N23 → N15 →
N3 → N13 → N12 → N20 → N37) and in SAODV (N0 →
N5 → N17 → N25 → N3 → N13 → N12 → N4 → N37).
Figure 6 shows the security level comparison of discov-
Figure 1. FLSL RREQ packets transmission (27
random nodes)
Figure 2. FLSL RREP packets transmission (27
random nodes)
ered route between FLSL protocol and AODV protocol
in same topology of 38 nodes. The security level value
is 24 in FLSL protocol, which is 4.35% increased from
23 in AODV protocol and remain same with in SAODV
protocol.
Figure 7 and 8 show the RREQ and RREP pack-
ets transmission route of FLSL protocol in 51 nodes
MANET network. The numbered lines indicate the de-
tailed procedures of route discovery. From the simula-
tion, we may observe that the discovered route in FLSL
(N0 → N46 → N30 → N29 → N9 → N18 → N20 → N50)
is different with the route in AODV (N0 → N43 →
N25 → N3 → N13 → N12 → N37 → N50) and in SAODV
Figure 3. Security level comparison (27 ran-
dom nodes)
Figure 4. FLSL RREQ packets transmission (38
random nodes)
Figure 5. FLSL RREP packets transmission (38
random nodes)
(N0 → N5 → N35 → N25 → N3 → N19 → N18 → N12 →
N37 → N50). Figure 9 shows the security level compar-
ison of discovered route among FLSL protocol, AODV
protocol and SAODV protocol in same topology of 51
nodes. The security level value is 39 in FLSL protocol,
which is 85.71% increased from 21 in AODV protocol
and 18.18% increased from 33 in SAODV protocol.
Figure 10 and 11 show the RREQ and RREP pack-
ets transmission route of FLSL protocol in 66 nodes
MANET network. The numbered lines indicate the de-
tailed procedures of route discovery. From the simula-
tion, we may observe that the discovered route in FLSL
(N0 → N41 → N56 → N36 → N13 → N12 → N4 → N65)
Figure 6. Security level comparison (38 ran-
dom nodes)
Figure 7. FLSL RREQ packets transmission (51
random nodes)
Figure 8. FLSL RREP packets transmission (51
random nodes)
is different with the route in AODV (N0 → N57 →
N58 → N29 → N13 → N12 → N8 → N65) and in SAODV
(N0 → N43 → N61 → N3 → N9 → N18 → N20 → N65).
Figure 12 shows the security level comparison of dis-
covered route among FLSL protocol, AODV protocol
and SAODV protocol in same topology of 66 nodes.
The security level value is 54 in FLSL protocol, which
is 50.00% increased from 36 in AODV protocol and
38.46% increased from 39 in SAODV protocol.
Figure 9. Security level comparison (51 ran-
dom nodes)
Figure 10. FLSL RREQ packets transmission
(66 random nodes)
Figure 11. FLSL RREP packets transmission
(66 random nodes)
4.2. The Performance Comparison
Figure 13 and 14 show the performance com-
parison between FLSL protocol, AODV protocol and
SAODV protocol. Two comparison parameters are in-
volved, the security level of final route and the time con-
sumption of route discovery process.
Figure 13 shows the security level of final route for
five sessions. In all five sessions, the security level val-
ues increase by 4.35%-200.00% from AODV to FLSL,
and by 18.18%-200.00% from SAODV to FLSL. This
indicates that the implementation of FLSL protocol en-
able the destination node to select a relatively securer
Figure 12. Security level comparison (66 ran-
dom nodes)
Figure 13. Security level comparison
Figure 14. Route discovery time comparison
route for data transmission.
Figure 14 shows the time consumption comparison
of route discovery processing for the five same sessions.
All five sessions show the FLSL protocol consumes
more time than in AODV protocol (9.92%-38.50%
increases) and SAODV protocol (2.30%-16.43% in-
creases). In the extra consumed time, the fuzzy logic
algorithm calculates the security level values, and up-
dates and switches route of the destination node. From
the time consumption values of FLSL in five sessions,
we may observe that there is an obvious increase with
the increase of number of nodes. Each node which
receives RREQ/RREP packet has to calculate security
level value. More nodes will consume longer time than
fewer nodes.
The experiment results showed the FLSL protocol
could reliably select the data transmission route with
high security level, and self-adaptively and dynami-
cally adjust the route updating without delay. Compar-
ing with AODV and SAODV routing protocols, FLSL
spends reasonable and affordable time on security-level
algorithm and route selection to improve the reliably
and security of MANETs.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we closely studied the current prob-
lems of routing protocols in MANET, including the re-
liability, feasibility, security and performance etc, and
developed solutions to those problems. We deliberated
and implemented a secure end-to-end protocol, Adap-
tive Fuzzy Logic Based Security Level Routing(FLSL),
which enables the nodes to discover and determine most
secure route in MANET. In comparing with AODV and
SAODV, the FLSL protocol is capable of determining a
more secure route among possible routes.
We also demonstrated the feasibility and the fea-
tures of FLSL protocol in NS-2 platform. Simulation
demonstrated the feasibility of FLSL protocol and the
performance of FLSL is comparable but more secure
than other secure routing protocols.
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